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Abstract
Under current business models, consumers have to
hand over their personal data to “digital giants” in
exchange for high-quality services. Should consumers
be empowered to have ownership towards the data they
generated through their own actions in the platform
firm’s site? New technologies emerge to empower
consumers to control their own data, and the platform
firm may need to compensate for the usage of
consumers’ private data. How consumers and the firm
should react to such data ownership empowerment
policy, however, is not clear. We build a theoretical
model in which consumers have different sensitivities to
the loss of data ownership. We show that the impact of
data ownership empowerment depends not only on the
firm’s revenue structure, but also on consumers’ need
for customized services. The results of the welfare
analysis offer managerial implications for policy
making.

1. Introduction and Relevant Literature
When using online platforms (e.g., Google), consumers
generate large amounts of data including location
information, key words searched, browsing history, IP
and cookies, etc. Users usually have no control over
their own data; while platform firms, however, are
collecting and utilizing such data for their big data
enabled customized services such as personalized
recommendations, etc., which brings huge revenues to
the platform firms, such as Amazon and Harrah’s [1]
[2], and none of such revenues is shared with the
platform users. On one hand, firms can learn users’
individual preferences from the data and provide highquality customized services, which usually improves
consumer welfare; on the other, consumers are suffering
from the loss of data ownership: improper access to
personal information and unauthorized secondary use of
personal information can make consumers worse off [3].
Unfortunately, users currently have to hand over their
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personal data to “digital giants” in exchange for online
services [4].
Who should own the data that generated in the
process when consumers browse, search and make
purchase in the firm’s site? It is obvious that currently
such data is the platform firm’s property as they build
information systems to track and store such data.
Recently, however, some new technologies emerge to
empower consumers to control their own data. For
example, “Solid” (led by Tim Berners-Lee) gives users
freedom to choose whether or not to allow applications
to access their own data by decoupling user generated
content from the application itself: the data is stored in
decentralized “pods” and only available to the
applications in the user’s “permission list” [4]. Another
example is “repay.me”. By using block chain
technologies to ensure the safety of their data,
consumers are empowered to track the revenue
generated from their personal data [5]. These
technologies make it possible for individual consumers
to track and monitor the usage of their own private data,
so that the firm needs to compensate for the usage of
such private data.
What are the implications of such technologies as
well as the empowerment of data ownership? How
should consumers decide whether to provide their data
to firms in exchange for services, as well as
compensation? How should firms optimally adjust the
service quality or compensation strategies? Is the
empowerment welfare-enhancing? Which firms should
apply such data ownership empowerment policy?
This study goes beyond simple privacy protection
and examines the impacts of data ownership
empowerment. Consistent with existing literature, we
argue that firms can manipulate its service quality facing
different data policies. We model how a profitmaximizing firm should strategically provide data
compensation. In our model, consumer utilities are
influenced by both consumer characteristics (e.g.,
sensitivities towards loss of data ownership) and
platform characteristics (e.g., service quality).
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By incorporating firm’s cost of providing services
with consumers’ need for customized services, we find
that the impact of data ownership empowerment
depends not only on the firm’s revenue structure, but
also on consumers’ need for customized services.
Specifically:
1. The firm is not necessarily worse off when
consumers are empowered. We identify conditions
under which a firm makes more profit from the data
ownership empowerment.
2. Contrary to the common belief that consumers
benefit from obtaining data ownership, we find that the
empowerment
un-uniformly
affects
different
consumers. The welfare of consumers who are sensitive
to loss of data ownership improves because their rights
are protected; however, consumers who are not sensitive
to loss of data ownership may be worse off because the
quality of service they receive may drop after the
empowerment policy implementation.
In the literature, online privacy has been discussed
extensively. First, consumers are concerned with the use
of their personal data. Surveys indicate that privacy
concerns prevent some consumers from using online
services [6]. Hann et al. (2007) quantify individuals’
valuation toward privacy and find that website privacy
protection is worth between US$30.49 and $44.62 to
U.S. consumers [7]. In addition, surveys and
experiments reveal that individuals vary in their
sensitivities towards privacy [8]. Following this result,
our model differentiates consumers by their sensitivity
towards loss of data ownership. Second, Hui et al.
(2007) find that individuals could be induced to disclose
information by monetary incentives [9]. Our model is
consistent in that firms can offer compensation for
consumers’ private data.
Our study is closely related to several prior studies
and generates additional results. Byungwan et al. (2017)
study the impact of voluntary profiling on consumer
surplus and social welfare [10]. In their monopoly
model, consumers can participate in profiling to reduce
search cost while losing their privacy. A key difference
between their study and ours is that they focus more on
voluntary data provision, whereas our model considers
the case where the firm can offer compensation to data
providers in exchange for data ownership.
Rodrigo et al. (2019) studies the value of personal
information in online markets [11]. In their study, a firm
can use consumers’ private information to price
discriminate, and consumers can prevent their data from
being used by paying a “privacy cost”. Different from
their study, in our study, consumers who are empowered
do not need to pay for data protection, instead, they get
compensated by the firm for using their data. Finally,
Jay et al. (2019) build a theoretical model to study the
optimal data collection policy [12]. Firm’s service

quality is not modeled in their model, though. Our
model is different in that consumers do NOT need to pay
for the online services; instead of firm’s pricing
strategies, we focus our attention on firm’s quality
decisions.
Our model makes the first attempt to combine both
service quality and data compensation in a framework
in which consumers are empowered to have data
ownership. The results of the welfare analysis offer
managerial implications for policy makers.

2. Theoretical Model
We build a theoretical model to examine the impact
of empowering consumers to have data ownership.
Consider an online platform firm, such as a search
engine, online marketplace, social media site, etc.,
providing free-of-charge online services of quality 𝑡 ≥
0. Assume that the cost of providing such services is
increasing in the service quality. For simplicity, let 𝑚𝑡 2
represent the cost function, where 𝑚 > 0.
Consumers are differentiated by their sensitivity
towards loss of data ownership (𝜃), where 𝜃 ∼ 𝑈[0, 1].
When consumers do not have data ownership, they
derive values from the free online services, while their
data is asked in return for the free services: the firm is
free to collect and make use of their private data, which
makes consumers suffer from losing control over their
data. Then for a consumer with sensitivity 𝜃, the utility
of using the firm’s services can be represented by
𝑈(𝜃, 𝑡) = (1 − 𝜃)𝑡.
From this utility function, we can see that
consumers’ sensitivity towards the loss of data
ownership weakly discounts the quality of service
provided by the firm. To illustrate, if 𝜃 = 0 , the
consumer does not value data ownership and the utility
equals to the service quality set by the firm; if 𝜃 = 1, the
consumer is extremely sensitive about the private data
being used by the firm, and is indifferent between using
the firm’s services and leaving.
Because consumers usually generate more traffic
and bring more revenue to the firm when they are more
satisfied with the online services, we assume that the
revenue ( 𝑅(𝜃, 𝑡) ) that the firm generates from a
consumer 𝜃 is proportional to the consumer’s utility of
using the services, and the revenue is higher if the firm
is able to use consumers’ private data. Without loss of
generality, let 𝑅(𝜃, 𝑡) = (𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑈(𝜃, 𝑡) if the firm can
use the private data, and 𝑅(𝜃, 𝑡) = 𝑎𝑈(𝜃, 𝑡) if the firm
cannot, where 𝑎 > 0 and 𝑏 > 0.
We first consider the case in which the firm is free
to use the data generated by consumers. By adding up
the revenue generated from each consumer, the firm’s
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total revenue can be represented by 𝑅(𝑡) =
1
1
∫0 𝑅(𝜃, 𝑡)𝑑𝜃 = 2 (𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑡.
The firm’s decision problem is to maximize its
profit by adjusting the quality level:
1
max 𝜋 = (𝑎 + 𝑏)𝑡 − 𝑚𝑡 2 .
𝑡

2

Solving the optimal quality, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium Outcomes)
When consumers do NOT have data ownership, the
firm’s equilibrium quality, the corresponding profit as
well as consumer surplus are
Service quality

𝑡𝑁∗ =

Firm profit

𝑃𝑁∗ =

(𝑎+𝑏)

;

4𝑚
(𝑎+𝑏)2
16𝑚
(𝑎+𝑏)

;

Consumer surplus
𝑆𝑁∗ =
.
8𝑚
Intuitively, consumers are suffering from the loss of
data ownership since their data is being used by the firm.
Interestingly, however, Lemma 1 reveals that letting
firm utilize such data may sometimes bring benefit to
consumers. This is because the equilibrium service
quality is increasing in 𝑏, the per-unit revenue derived
from using consumers’ private data. That is, when 𝑏 is
large, it is better for the firm to improve the service
quality to attract more traffic and therefore, acquire
more data generated since the revenue from the data is
large. Therefore, when 𝑏 is large, the extra benefit
brought to the consumers by the firm from improving
the service quality to attract more data may overcome
the negative utility from the loss of data ownership.
Now we analyze the case in which consumers are
empowered to have data ownership. That is, the
platform firm needs to offer compensation for the usage
of the data generated by consumers. Consumers now
face two choices: allowing the firm to use their data or
not allowing. For data providers, the utility of using the
services is represented by (1 − 𝜃)𝑡, which is identical
to the utility function in the previous case. For
consumers who refuse to provide data, there’s no data
ownership loss. However, because the firm fails to learn
their preferences from the data and therefore, cannot
provide customized services for them, we assume that
they receive a lower-quality service. Then the
consumers’ utility of using the services without
providing data can be represented by 𝛿𝑡 , where 𝛿 ∈
(0, 1) represents the ratio of the non-customized service
quality to the customized service quality. In addition, we
assume that consumer type 𝜃, service quality 𝑡 as well
as 𝛿 are public information.
Following the assumption that firm revenue is
proportional to the consumer’s utility of using the
services, we represent the revenue of the firm by:

(𝑎 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝜃)𝑡
𝑅(𝜃, 𝑡) = {
𝑎𝛿𝑡

from data providers;
from other consumers.

(1)

Because from equation (1) , we obtain that
𝑎𝛿
when 𝜃 < 1 −
, the firm makes more revenue if
𝑎+𝑏
consumer 𝜃 provides his/her data, we assume that the
firm can offer compensation to data providers to
encourage consumers to provide data. We study the
ideal case, in which the firm can differentiate each
consumer type 𝜃 and can provide individualized
compensation for each consumer. The firm’s optimal
compensation strategy is shown in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Firm’s Optimal Compensation Strategy
and the Equilibrium Consumer Utility)
(1) The firm’s optimal compensation strategy is to offer
compensation to consumers in the interval [1 − 𝛿, 1 −
𝑏𝛿
𝛿+
] , and the optimal compensation is given
𝑎+𝑏+1
by 𝐶(𝜃, 𝑡) = (𝜃 + 𝛿 − 1)𝑡;
(2) In equilibrium, consumer utility function is given by
𝑖𝑓 𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝛿;
(1 − 𝜃)𝑡,
𝑏𝛿
𝑖𝑓 1 − 𝛿 < 𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝛿 +
;
𝑈(𝜃, 𝑡) = { 𝛿𝑡,
𝑎+𝑏+1
𝑏𝛿
𝛿𝑡,
𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 1 − 𝛿 +
.
𝑎+𝑏+1
Lemma 2 indicates that in equilibrium, consumers
can be divided into three groups: 1. Data providers
without compensation (𝜃 < 1 − 𝛿): consumers who are
not sensitive to the loss of data ownership are willing to
provide their private data and the firm has no incentive
to offer them compensation; 2. Consumers who refuse
𝑏𝛿
to provide data (𝜃 > 1 − 𝛿 +
): the firm would
𝑎+𝑏+1
also not offer compensation to these consumers because
it would be too expensive. 3. Consumers who receive
𝑏𝛿
compensation (1 − 𝛿 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝛿 +
): The firm
𝑎+𝑏+1
offers compensation to the consumers in the medium
range. The three groups of consumers are presented in
Figure 1.

Figure 1 Consumers’ reactions to data compensation

From the results of Lemma 2, the total
compensation offered to consumers can be represented
1−𝛿+

𝑏𝛿

1

2

𝑏𝛿

by ∫1−𝛿 𝑎+𝑏+1 𝐶(𝜃, 𝑡)𝑑𝜃 = 𝑡 (
) , and by adding
2
𝑎+𝑏+1
up the revenue from each consumer in equation (1), we
can obtain that the firm’s total revenue is:
∫

𝑏𝛿
1−𝛿+
𝑎+𝑏+1

1

(𝑎 + 𝑏)(1 − 𝜃)𝑡𝑑𝜃 + ∫

0

1−𝛿+
1

𝑏𝛿

2

𝑎+𝑏+1

= { (𝑎 + 𝑏) [1 − (𝛿 −

2

𝑎𝛿𝑡𝑑𝜃

𝑏𝛿
𝑎+𝑏+1
𝑎𝛿+𝛿

) ] + 𝑎𝛿(

𝑎+𝑏+1

)} 𝑡.
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Therefore, the firm solves the following problem to
maximize its profit:
1

𝑏𝛿

2

𝑎+𝑏+1

𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜋 = { (𝑎 + 𝑏) [1 − (𝛿 −
𝑡

𝑎𝛿(

𝑎𝛿+𝛿
𝑎+𝑏+1

1

)− (

𝑏𝛿

2 𝑎+𝑏+1

2

) ]+

2

) } 𝑡 − 𝑚𝑡 2 .

Solving the optimal quality, we have Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium Outcomes).
When consumers are empowered to have data
ownership, the firm’s equilibrium quality, the
corresponding profit as well as consumer surplus are:
1
𝑎2 + 𝑎 − 𝑏
Service
𝑡𝑌∗ =
[𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝛿 2 (
)]
Quality
4𝑚
𝑎+𝑏+1
2

Firm
Profit
Consumer
Surplus

𝑎2 + 𝑎 − 𝑏
)]
𝑎+𝑏+1
𝑃𝑌∗ =
16𝑚
2
2 𝑎 +𝑎−𝑏
[𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝛿 (
)]
𝑎
+𝑏+1
𝑆𝑌∗ =
8𝑚/(1 + 𝛿 2 )
[𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝛿 2 (

3. The Impact of the Empowerment
We are interested in examining the impact of data
ownership empowerment. By comparing Lemma 1 and
Lemma 3, we can obtain the differences in the service
quality, firm profit and consumer surplus. For example,
we let ∆𝑡 ≝ 𝑡𝑌∗ − 𝑡𝑁∗ , then ∆𝑡 > 0 implies that data
ownership empowerment improves the service quality
and vice versa.
We first study the impact of the data ownership
empowerment on the firm. Intuitively, when consumers
are empowered, because some of the consumers require
compensation for providing data, the firm is worse off
due to the cost of compensation payment for using data.
The empowerment, however, can also bring the firm
more traffic from the consumers who are sensitive to
loss of data ownership since they no longer need to
worry about the data ownership loss. Therefore, the
impact on the firm depends on the tradeoff between the
cost of compensation payment and the extra traffic from
the consumers who are sensitive to loss of data
ownership.
Proposition 1 (The Impact of the Data Ownership
Empowerment on Firm)
When consumers are empowered to have data
ownership, both service quality and firm profit increase
if 𝑎 + 𝑎2 > 𝑏, and decrease if 𝑎 + 𝑎2 < 𝑏.
Interestingly, Proposition 1 reveals that the impact
of the data ownership empowerment on the firm is
contingent on the firm’s revenue structure. If the firm
revenue from the traffic is relatively large while the
revenue from the consumers’ private data is relatively
small (𝑎 + 𝑎2 > 𝑏), after consumers are empowered to
have data ownership, firm revenue from consumers who

do NOT value data ownership doesn’t reduce too much
since 𝑏 is relatively small, and the benefit of the extra
traffic may be more than the loss of the cost of
compensation payment. On contrary, the empowerment
makes the firm worse off when 𝑏 is sufficiently large
comparing to 𝑎 (𝑎 + 𝑎2 < 𝑏). That’s because in this
case, the revenue derived from using consumers’ private
data is large, while consumers who are sensitive to loss
of data ownership refuse to provide the data when they
are empowered. In summary, the firm may not be worse
off from the data ownership empowerment and the
impact on firm depends on the firm’s revenue structure.
Next, we examine the impact of data ownership
empowerment on consumers. Intuitively, the data
ownership empowerment makes consumers better off
because they are empowered to have the right to avoid
data ownership loss and can also receive compensation.
However, Proposition 1 shows that the service quality 𝑡
changes after the empowerment, which also makes
impacts on the welfare of the consumers. If the firm
revenue from the traffic is relatively large (𝑎 + 𝑎2 >
𝑏), the empowerment of data ownership increases the
quality of services, then all consumers benefit from this
improvement in quality, which is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Consumer utility
when 𝑎 + 𝑎2 > 𝑏

Figure 3 Consumer utility
when 𝑎 + 𝑎2 < 𝑏

If the revenue from the consumers’ private data is
relatively large (𝑏 > 𝑎 + 𝑎2 ), however, the impact of
the data ownership empowerment is more complex.
Consumers’ rights are protected, as shown in Figure 3,
and consumers who are sensitive to the data ownership
𝑏−𝑎−𝑎2

( 𝜃 > 1 − 𝛿 + 𝛿 3 (𝑎+𝑏+1)(𝑎+𝑏) ) become better off.
However, in this case, empowering consumers leads to
a reduction in the service quality 𝑡, which is harmful to
consumers who are NOT sensitive to loss of data
𝑏−𝑎−𝑎2

ownership ( 𝜃 < 1 − 𝛿 + 𝛿 3 (𝑎+𝑏+1)(𝑎+𝑏) ), and may
even reduce the total consumer surplus.
Proposition 2 (The Impact of Data Ownership
Empowerment on Consumers)
The empowerment of data ownership improves
consumer surplus in general; However, consumer
surplus decreases if 𝑎 <
1−2𝑎−√1−16𝑎−8𝑎2

3√2
4

− 1, 𝛿 > √

𝑏 2 +2𝑎𝑏+2𝑎2 +2𝑎
𝑏−𝑎−𝑎2

1−2𝑎+√1−16𝑎−8𝑎2

<𝑏<
.
2
Proposition 2 shows that data ownership
empowerment may hurt consumer surplus if the
and

2
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empowerment makes the equilibrium quality drop down
dramatically. Specifically, because the impact of data
ownership on ∆𝑡 (note that ∆𝑡 = 𝑡𝑌∗ − 𝑡𝑁∗ =
𝛿2

𝑎2 +𝑎−𝑏

(
) ) increases in both 𝑎 and 𝛿 and decreases
𝑎+𝑏+1
in 𝑏, consumer surplus may decrease when 𝑎 is small, 𝑏
is large and 𝛿 is large. Interestingly, Proposition 2 also
4𝑚

1−2𝑎+√1−16𝑎−8𝑎2

reveals a sufficiently large 𝑏 ( 𝑏 ≥
)
2
ensures that the data ownership empowerment improves
overall consumer surplus. This is because in this case,
the revenue from consumers’ private data is sufficiently
large, the firm have to offer a large compensation, which
is more than the surplus loss due to the drop in the
quality.

4. Conclusion
With internet economy grows into a more and more
important part of our daily life, data ownership
gradually becomes an important issue, that is, who
should own the data? Should consumers be empowered
and entitled to charge for the firm’s usage of their
private data? This paper examines the impact of
empowering consumers with data ownership on both of
the firm and consumers. Our theoretical model studies
the optimal strategies of firm and consumers facing
different data ownership policies. It turns out that the
impact depends not only on the firm’s revenue structure,
but also on consumers’ need for customized services.
When consumers are empowered to have data
ownership, consumer surplus increases in general;
surprisingly, however, they may also be worse off if the
value of the private data to the firm is moderate, the
firm’s revenue from its traffic is low and consumers’
need for customized services is low. The firm is better
off if the per-unit revenue from the private data is low
compared to the per-unit revenue generated from the
traffic, and worse off otherwise.
Our work is not without limitation. First, we only
study the monopoly case. That is, the firm has sufficient
market power to change the quality and compensation
policies. A possible future direction is to study a
competitive market or a duopoly market. Second, we
only examine the case that the firm has linear revenue
function with a quadratic cost function. Future work can
also study different types of revenue and cost functions.
Third, in this paper, consumers only have two choices:
to either provide or refuse to provide all of their private
data. Future work may relax this restriction, and allow
consumers to provide only part of their data. Fourth, our
theoretical model reflects a relatively new phenomenon
and so far there is few empirical data available. Field
experiments can be carried out for future work to test the
validity of our work.

5. Technical Details
We provide the proof details of the lemmas,
propositions and corollaries bellow.
Proof of Lemma 1
(𝑎+𝑏)

𝜕𝜋

𝜕2 𝜋

Let = 0, we get 𝑡𝑁∗ =
and 2 = −2𝑚 < 0
𝜕𝑡
4𝑚
𝜕𝑡
makes sure that it is the firm’s optimal quality.
1
1
Consumer surplus 𝑆(𝑡) = ∫0 𝑈(𝜃, 𝑡)𝑑𝜃 = 𝑡 .
2

(𝑎+𝑏)

Plugging 𝑡𝑁∗ =
into consumer surplus function and
4𝑚
profit function, the results are the equilibrium consumer
surplus and firm profit respectively.
Proof of Lemma 2
(1) For 𝜃 ≥ 1 − 𝛿, if the compensation 𝐶(𝜃, 𝑡) <
(𝜃 + 𝛿 − 1)𝑡, consumers would refuse to provide data
since (1 − 𝜃)𝑡 + 𝐶(𝜃, 𝑡) < 𝛿𝑡, which means the utility
of providing data is smaller. As a result, the
compensation must be at least as large as (𝜃 + 𝛿 − 1)𝑡.
Also, the compensation cannot be larger than (𝜃 + 𝛿 −
1)𝑡 because it cannot bring more revenue to the firm.
𝑏𝛿
(2) 𝜃 ≤ 1 − 𝛿 +
if and only if (𝑎 + 𝑏)(1 −
𝑎+𝑏+1
(𝜃
𝜃)𝑡 − + 𝛿 − 1)𝑡 ≥ 𝑎𝛿𝑡 and therefore, it is
worthwhile for the firm to offer compensation to the
consumers.
(3) It equals to the summation of the utility of using
the services and the compensation.
Proof of Lemma 3
Let
𝜕2 𝜋

𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑡

= 0, we get 𝑡𝑌∗ =

1
4𝑚

[𝑎 + 𝑏 + 𝛿 2 (

𝑎2 +𝑎−𝑏
𝑎+𝑏+1

)]

and 2 = −2𝑚 < 0 makes sure that it is the firm’s
𝜕𝑡
optimal quality.
1
1
Consumer surplus 𝑆(𝑡) = ∫0 𝑈(𝜃, 𝑡)𝑑𝜃 = (1 +
2
𝛿 2 )𝑡. Plugging 𝑡𝑌∗ into consumer surplus function and
profit function, the results are the equilibrium consumer
surplus and firm profit respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let

∗
𝑡𝑌

∗
𝑡𝑁

> 1, and it is equivalent to 𝛿 2 (

𝑎2 +𝑎−𝑏
𝑎+𝑏+1

) > 0.

Since all 𝑎, b and 𝛿 is positive parameters, we know
that

∗
𝑡𝑌

∗
𝑡𝑁

> 1 if and only if 𝑎 + 𝑎2 > 𝑏.

Similarly,

∗
𝑡𝑌
∗
𝑡𝑁

< 1 if and only if 𝑎 + 𝑎2 < 𝑏.

Proof of Proposition 2
It is easy to know that
√

𝑏 2 +2𝑎𝑏+2𝑎2 +2𝑎
𝑏−𝑎−𝑎2

1 must hold if

𝑆𝑌∗
∗
𝑆𝑁

< 1 is equivalent to 𝛿 >

. Note that 𝛿 ≤ 1, so

𝑆𝑌∗

<

𝑏 2 +2𝑎𝑏+2𝑎2 +2𝑎
𝑏−𝑎−𝑎2

<

𝑆𝑁∗ .
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Next, we show that when
1 if and only if 𝑎 <
𝑏<

3√2
4

𝑆𝑌∗
∗
𝑆𝑁

< 1,

− 1 and

𝑏 2 +2𝑎𝑏+2𝑎2 +2𝑎
𝑏−𝑎−𝑎2

1−2𝑎−√1−16𝑎−8𝑎2
2

<
<

1−2𝑎+√1−16𝑎−8𝑎2

.
2
We claim that 𝑏 − 𝑎 − 𝑎2 > 0 when 𝑆𝑌∗ < 𝑆𝑁∗ .
That’s because if 𝑏 − 𝑎 − 𝑎2 ≤ 0, the quality of the
services improves when consumers are empowered to
have data ownership and consumer surplus cannot
decline for every 𝜃. This contradicts 𝑆𝑌∗ < 𝑆𝑁∗ .
The positive denominator (𝑏 − 𝑎 − 𝑎2 > 0) makes
𝑏 2 +2𝑎𝑏+2𝑎2 +2𝑎

sure that
< 1 is equivalent to 𝑏 2 − (1 −
𝑏−𝑎−𝑎2
2𝑎)𝑏 + 3𝑎(𝑎 + 1) < 0. Note that equation 𝑏 2 − (1 −
2𝑎)𝑏 + 3𝑎(𝑎 + 1) = 0 has two roots (
and

1−2𝑎+√1−16𝑎−8𝑎2

Therefore,

2
𝑏 2 +2𝑎𝑏+2𝑎2 +2𝑎

𝑏−𝑎−𝑎2
1−2𝑎−√1−16𝑎−8𝑎2

1 and
that 𝑆𝑌∗ < 𝑆𝑁∗ .

2

)

when

1−2𝑎−√1−16𝑎−8𝑎2

𝑎<

2
3√2
4

−1

< 1 if and only if 𝑎 <

<𝑏<

1−2𝑎+√1−16𝑎−8𝑎2
2

3√2
4

.
−

given
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